A connected medical device can help clinicians monitor a patient’s condition, guide treatment, or deliver information to a hospital’s electronic health record system. Yet every connection also creates a potential route for unauthorised access. A vulnerable patient monitor, an outdated imaging workstation, or a compromised software provider can introduce risks that extend beyond IT systems and affect the delivery of care.
This is why Healthcare Cybersecurity must be treated as a patient safety priority, not simply a technical responsibility. Hospitals increasingly depend on connected equipment, cloud-based applications, laboratory networks, remote monitoring platforms, and external clinical service providers. Protecting these environments requires an understanding of how technology supports clinical workflows and what could happen if a system becomes unavailable or its information can no longer be trusted.
The scale of the challenge is evident in the 2025 Medical Device Cybersecurity Index published by RunSafe Security. Its survey of 605 healthcare executives in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany found that 22% of participating healthcare organisations had experienced cyberattacks directly affecting medical devices. Among those reporting such incidents, three-quarters said patient care had been disrupted, and 24% reported that patients had to be transferred to other facilities.
These findings highlight the need for security strategies that protect connected devices while preserving the availability of essential clinical services.
Understand the Risks Across Connected Medical Devices
Medical devices differ considerably in their design, age, purpose, and ability to receive software updates. An imaging system, an infusion pump, a bedside monitor, and a connected diagnostic instrument may run different operating systems and depend on different vendors for maintenance. Some devices cannot be patched easily without affecting certification, compatibility, or clinical workflows.
Healthcare Cybersecurity begins with understanding what is connected, how each device communicates, and which systems it depends on. Hospitals need an accurate inventory that includes device ownership, software versions, network connections, vendor support arrangements, and clinical importance. Without that visibility, security teams may not recognise that a seemingly minor device is connected to a sensitive system or operating with an unsupported configuration.
The US Food and Drug Administration’s February 2026 guidance on medical-device cybersecurity emphasises security throughout the device life cycle, including design, documentation, and the ability to deliver updates and patches.
Although this guidance applies within the US regulatory context, its focus on maintaining device security after deployment offers a useful lesson for healthcare organisations elsewhere.
The objective is not to treat every device identically. A vulnerability affecting equipment that directly supports patient treatment may require a different response from one affecting a non-clinical workstation. Risk assessments should consider both the likelihood of exploitation and the potential consequences for patient care.
Segment Networks and Limit Unnecessary Access
Once devices have been identified, healthcare organisations need to control how they communicate with other systems. A connected device should not have unrestricted access to administrative networks, patient records, or unrelated clinical equipment simply because everything operates within the same hospital.
Network segmentation helps create boundaries between medical devices, clinical applications, corporate IT systems, and building-management infrastructure. Access rules can then limit communication to the connections required for clinical operations. If one device is compromised, these boundaries can reduce the opportunity for an attacker to move deeper into the environment.
Effective Healthcare Cybersecurity also requires careful management of remote access. Medical equipment manufacturers and maintenance providers may need to connect to systems for diagnostics, troubleshooting, or software updates. Those connections should use approved access routes, strong authentication, time-limited permissions, and activity logging. Unused accounts and persistent remote connections should be removed or disabled.
Consider a hospital whose imaging equipment depends on an external vendor for maintenance. If the vendor’s account is compromised, unrestricted network access could expose other clinical systems. Restricting that account to the necessary equipment and requiring approval for remote sessions can limit the potential damage without preventing legitimate support.
Segmentation must be designed around clinical requirements. A poorly planned network change could interrupt the exchange of information between a device and its monitoring station. Healthcare IT, clinical engineering, and medical staff should therefore test changes together and maintain documented procedures for restoring essential connections.
Strengthen Third-Party and Clinical System Security
Hospitals depend on an extensive network of external organisations, including electronic health record providers, laboratory services, imaging specialists, cloud vendors, and medical-device manufacturers. These relationships improve access to expertise and technology, but they also create dependencies that healthcare organisations cannot always monitor directly.
The 2024 HIMSS Healthcare Cybersecurity Survey, published in 2025, found that significant incidents involving third parties had affected 43% of surveyed organisations through clinical service disruptions and 43% through data breaches. Half reported business disruption, illustrating how a vendor incident can spread beyond the immediate technical environment.
Healthcare Cybersecurity programmes should therefore assess vendors before contracts are signed and throughout the relationship. Organisations need to understand how providers protect sensitive information, manage vulnerabilities, control subcontractors, and respond to incidents. Contracts should establish security expectations, notification requirements, access restrictions, and responsibilities for restoring services after a disruption.
The assessment should also cover the way systems exchange information. Application programming interfaces, file transfers, shared credentials, and automated integrations can all become routes for unauthorised access if they are not properly secured. Strong authentication, encrypted communication, restricted permissions, and monitoring of unusual activity help reduce these risks.
Not every supplier requires the same level of scrutiny. A vendor with access to patient records or systems essential to clinical care deserves closer oversight than one providing a service with no access to sensitive networks. Prioritising suppliers according to their access and potential impact allows security teams to direct limited resources where they matter most.
Manage Vulnerabilities Without Disrupting Patient Care
Healthcare organisations often face a difficult choice when a device contains a known vulnerability but cannot be patched immediately. Installing an update without sufficient testing may disrupt clinical operations, while leaving the vulnerability unresolved can expose the device to attack.
A practical Healthcare Cybersecurity strategy combines vulnerability monitoring with clinical risk assessment. Security teams should track vendor advisories, identify affected devices, and establish deadlines for remediation based on severity and operational impact. When an immediate patch is not feasible, temporary safeguards such as network isolation, stricter access controls, and disabling unnecessary services can reduce exposure until a validated fix becomes available.
The US Department of Health and Human Services’ 2025 Health Sector Cybersecurity Survey identified ransomware, phishing, compromised credentials, and third-party credentials among the leading threats facing healthcare organisations.
These risks reinforce the importance of multifactor authentication, timely access reviews, reliable backups, and staff awareness alongside device-specific protections.
Hospitals should also test incident response procedures before an emergency occurs. Teams need to know how to isolate compromised equipment, contact manufacturers, preserve clinical records, and switch to safe alternative workflows. Downtime procedures are especially important where clinicians depend on digital systems for medication administration, diagnostics, or patient monitoring.
Make Cybersecurity Part of Clinical Operations
Technology teams cannot protect medical environments effectively in isolation. Clinical engineering staff understand device behaviour, clinicians know which systems are essential to treatment, and security specialists understand the threats and technical controls. Regular collaboration helps ensure that security decisions reflect the realities of patient care.
Healthcare Cybersecurity should also be measured through practical indicators, including how quickly critical vulnerabilities are addressed, how many devices have verified ownership, whether vendor access is reviewed, and how reliably essential services can be restored after an incident. These measures help leadership identify weaknesses before they become operational emergencies.
Connected medical devices and third-party clinical systems will remain central to modern healthcare. Protecting them requires visibility, carefully controlled access, disciplined vendor oversight, and tested recovery procedures. The most effective strategy is one that reduces cyber risk without creating new clinical hazards. When security becomes part of everyday operational planning, healthcare organisations can strengthen digital resilience while keeping their primary responsibility firmly in view: delivering safe, dependable patient care.
